Arthur Kane: or akane denverpost. A Kaiser spokeswoman declined to comment, citing a pending investigation. More in News. Hampton v. People, Colo. To aid him in his endeavors, he is given the power to compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoena. Although this rule provides supervision by the court, there is no authority under it to quash the subpoena if the district attorney has complied with the technical requirements of the rule.
Therefore, the court has no power to quash a subpoena that has been properly issued, and an attorney has no more right than any other witness to refuse to respond to a subpoena and must honor a subpoena properly issued and served. Losavio v. District Court, Colo. The parties have strenuously argued the applicability of attorney-client privilege. A client may exercise a privilege to prohibit certain testimony by his legal counsel once the attorney has been sworn as a witness.
See Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. However, the attorney-client privilege is not violated solely by issuance of a subpoena compelling an attorney to appear. District Court, supra. The trial court based its ruling solely on the determination that the actions of the district attorney were unethical. The parties have not referred to, nor have we found, any section of the Colorado Code of Professional Responsibility that would prohibit the district attorney from requesting such a subpoena; neither have we discovered any Colorado case law which would serve as authority for the court's conclusion.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to remand the matter to the county court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We accepted jurisdiction 1 of this case to clarify the rule governing the docketing of an appeal from a county court judgment in a superior court or district court.
We hold that petitioner's appeal was not docketed within a proper time and therefore no error was committed when the respondent court dismissed the appeal. In the Denver County Court, Tumbarello was joined as a third-party defendant in a civil case, and judgment was rendered against him on July 26, The following day he gave notice of appeal, made a motion for the designation of the record on appeal, made a designation of error, posted an appeal bond, and made a deposit for preparing the record.
On September 2, thirty-eight days after judgment was entered, the time for filing the record was extended to December 3rd, at the request of the county court clerk. The petitioner docketed the appeal in superior court on September 21, which was fifty-seven days after judgment was entered against him in county court. He now urges this court to reinstate the appeal, alleging that there was no lack of diligence by his counsel in perfecting an appeal, that no rule requires him to have acted other than as he did, and that the respondent court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing his appeal.
Section 1 b , C. Both the statute and the rule state, in pertinent part as follows:. The rule and the statute are not specific on how much time is to be allowed for docketing an appeal; however, both clearly provide that the docketing must take place no later than the time allowed for completing and lodging the record. In so ruling, we adopt the reasoning applied to a similarly worded rule of criminal procedure in Perdew v.
Denver, Colo. In Perdew, we construed the word "then" as meaning "soon after and next in the order of time after the filing of the notice of appeal in the county court," and we interpreted the criminal rule of procedure there at issue to mean that docketing should occur before the transcript is completed. Under both the civil and criminal procedures for appeals from county court, completion or lodging of the transcript is the step in perfecting an appeal which follows docketing, and forty days following judgment are allowed for completing or lodging it.
In Perdew, we held that the time allowed for completing a transcript was a reasonable and acceptable time element within which to docket an appeal, and that "[t]his time element is unaffected by any enlargement, for any reason, of the forty days provided for the lodging or preparation of the transcript.
We now apply the same time limit to the procedure for civil appeals from county court. The fifty-eight days between the entry of judgment and the docketing of the case in superior court was not a reasonable interval even if the time allowed for completing and lodging a transcript had been extended.
0コメント